In dicta, the Supreme Court in Heller cited the historical ban on "Dangerous and Unusual
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to Prison at the King's pleasure. 5 This appears to be the origin of the law against affrays, to which the Supreme Court's sources cite.
Cunningham defines Riding Armed, with dangerous and unusual weapons as an offense at Common law. [citation omitted] By the stat. 2 Ed. 3. Cap. 3. None shall ride armed by day or night to the terror of the people; or come with force and arms before the King's justices...but men may wear common arms according to their quality and fashion, and have attendants with them armed agreeable to their characters; all persons may ride or go armed take felons, suppress riots, execute the King's process… 6 Unfortunately, this definition merely states the name of the law, followed by the origins. The name of the law is filled with contestable definitions. Which weapons are dangerous and unusual? What does the word, "terror" mean?
A. Dangerous and Unusual Weapons
The term dangerous weapons, in the English common law, is a legal term of art 7 that usually included weapons designed to kill human beings. 8 The term, "unusual weapons" does not mean, contrary to the Heller court's opinion, "weapons not in common use". As it was used in the time of the founding fathers, the term, "unusual weapons" appears to mean "surprising or uncommon force". In an English case called Baron Snigge v. Shirton, a long term tenant was in a dispute with his landlord, and "kept the possession [of the house he rented] with drum, guns, and halberts". 9 This was considered keeping "his house with unusual weapons against a purchaser". 10 In another English case, a sailor was firing warning shots with a "musqet and ball" across the bow of another ship as a signal, and killed a man. 11 This firing was not done with unusual weapons. 12 In both cases, the weapons were in common use at the time. However, in one case, the weapon was unusual, while in the other case, it was not. The main difference between the cases is whether the use of force was a reasonable one.
Other, stricter laws outlawed specific types of weapons for certain individuals. "The keeping or carrying any gun-powder, shot, club, or other weapon, whatsoever, offensive or defensive, by any negroe or mulatto whatsoever (except in certain special cases) is an offence, for which the gun or other weapon may be seized, and the offender whipped, by order of a justice of the peace." 13 if these weapons were dangerous and unusual, within the meaning of the term, why did the legislators exhibit such verbosity? Why not simply save paper and ink and time and say, "The keeping of dangerous or unusual weapons by any negroe or mulatto is an offence"? It seems unlikely that the legislature would find this proposed language outlawed certain types of weapons that they wanted black people to be able to keep. After all, the legislature outlawed possession of "any weapon whatsoever" by black people. Similarly, King George III issued a statute outlawing the possession of "pistol, hanger, cutlass, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon with intent feloniously" 14 and declared, "such a person shall be deemed a rogue and a vagabond". 15 Why didn't the lawmakers use the term dangerous and unusual weapons in this case? There are three options. The first is that the terms mean the same, but the lawmakers simply preferred other language. The second option is that the term, "dangerous and unusual weapons" did not describe enough weapons to suit the lawmakers' desires. The third option is that the term, "dangerous and unusual weapons" does not describe a class of weapons, but rather describes a class of behavior.
This last option appears to make the most sense when one examines the way the word "unusual" is used in other legal contexts.
When discussing forcible entry or detainer, Blackstone states, "so that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that forbidden is such as is carried on and maintained, with force, with violence, and unusual weapons." 16 It would make little sense to think that the distinction was being drawn between peaceable entry and entry with weapons that are difficult to purchase or hard to find. Instead, the term "unusual weapons" means weapons that are being used in a threatening or shocking manner, or weapons that are being used to facilitate an unlawful endeavor.
This definition of unusual is supported by Blackstone's discussion of forfeited recognizance. "A recognizance for the good behavior may be forfeited … by going armed with unusual attendance, to the terror of the people." 17 In other words, terrifying people with gangs constitutes unusual attendance. Presumably, just as people may own weapons, large people may gather together, so long as their purpose is lawful. It is when those groups of people become threatening (or terrifying), that those groups are labeled as unusual attendance to the terror of the public. Similarly, when the manner in which one carries a weapon becomes threatening, it is labeled an unusual weapon to the terror of the public.
When used to describe weapons, the word, "unusual" is not being used in a different way than when it is being used to describe attendance. Blackstone states, "Any justice of the peace may… bind all those… who make any affray; or threaten to kill or beat another ; or contend together with hot and angry words ; or go about with unusual weapons or attendance, to the terror of the people" 18 . Just as the common law is not outlawing the assembly of misfits or strange people, the common law is not referring to the type of weapon involved when it mentions unusual weapons. Therefore, when the historical phrase, "dangerous and unusual weapons" is used to justify a ban on a class of weapons, it is a misuse, and an abuse of the historical definition. suggests the prohibition is primarily upon the types of armament that the military would use, not upon the small, concealable weapons that were in more common use by the people. 23 Clearly, the English and the Americans know how to outlaw weapons, whether they wish to outlaw all types, or only weapons of a certain class. The term, "dangerous and unusual weapons" did not describe a class of weapons. Rather it described a class of behavior with weapons.
B. Terror of the People
A 1675 dictionary defines terror as, "dread, great fear or fright"
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An affray may not be committed in private, 25 presumably because then, the public would not be terrified.
Another plain English dictionary from 1768 describes the word, "Bo" (which, I assume, is an older equivalent to the modern day "Boo!") as "A word of terror".
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Unfortunately, for our purposes, the oldest legal dictionaries that I could find with a definition of the word, "terror" come from the turn of the twentieth century. That state of mind which arises from the event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe; affright from apparent danger. One of the constituents of the offense of riot is that the acts of the persons engaged in it should be to the terror of the people, as a show of arms, threatening speeches, or turbulent gestures; but it is not requisite, in order to constitute this crime, that personal violence should be committed.
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The Collegiate Law Dictionary from 1925 defines terror as "1. The state of mind which arises from the event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe. 2. Affright from apparent danger." 28 It seems as though the gravamen of the word, "terror" is an apprehension of harm to come. In describing a mugging, James Wilson writes, "If one assault another with such circumstances of terror as to put him in fear, and he, in consequence of his fear, deliver his money; this is a sufficient degree of violence". 29 Later, Wilson describes arson as "a crime of deep malignity … The confusion and terror which attend arson, and the continued apprehension which follows it, are mischiefs frequently more distressing than even the loss of the property."
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In describing an ideal judge, Wilson writes, "He ought, indeed, to be a terror to evil doers".
31
Wilson writes, in describing interrogation methods, "terror is frequently added to fraud. The practice… is said… to have been derived its origin from the customs of the inquisition." 32 Giles
Jacob's law dictionary states, when describing a legal device known as a Surety of the Peace (which appears to be a promise not to harm), "the demand of the Surety of the Peace ought to be soon after the cause of fear; for the suffering much time to pass before it is demanded, shews that However, other old American case-law treats the word, "terror" as if it were synonymous with the word, "threat". One case mentions people "armed with all the terrors of forfeiture" 37 .
Another case mentions "the terror of public censure" 38 . A third case mentions "the terrors of a law-suit" 39 .
Clearly, it will be difficult to determine what the word terror means in the context of the common law tradition that the court in Heller describes, as "terror" has varying levels of severity, ranging from the feeling one gets when someone says, "bo" to the anticipation of a great catastrophe.
33 Giles Jacob, The law-dictionary : explaining the rise, progress, and present state of the English law; defining and interpreting the terms or words of art; and comprising copious information on the subjects of law, trade, and government. of persons in a publick place, to the terror of the citizens. They are considered as common nuisances. They may, and ought to be suppressed by every person present; and the law, as it gives authority, so it gives protection, to those who obey its authority in suppressing them, and in apprehending such as are engaged in them ; if by every person present ; then still more strongly by the officers of peace and justice (footnote omitted). In some cases, there may be an affray, where there is no actual violence ; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terror among the people.
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Again, we see that an affray is a crime committed only in the presence of others. The exception listed at the end of the quoted section is not an exception to the public requirement, but is rather an exception to the actual violence requirement. Heller cites this as part of the common law tradition that supports a test of whether a class of weapon was in common use. 43 However, the only possible class of weapons in this quote comes a fallacious definition of the term "dangerous and unusual". To say that this source fairly supports a restriction based on which weapons were in common usage at the time is dubious.
C. John A. Dunlap
Justice Scalia next points us to John A. Dunlap's The New-York Justice, which discusses the crime of affray, An affray is the fighting of two or more persons in some public place to the terror of the people; for if the fighting be in private it is not an affray, but an assault ; neither will threatening words amount to an affray, although it seems that the constable may, at the request of the party threatened, carry the person using the threats before a justice of the peace, in order that he may find sureties. … As where two persons coolly and deliberately engage in a duel; this being attended with an apparent intention and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of justice, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually ensued. It is likewise said to be an affray, at common law, for a man to arm himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such manner as will naturally cause terror to the people. 
D. C. Humphrey
The court then refers to C. Humphrey's A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky, 46 which says, Riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the people of the land, which is punishable by forfeiture of the arms, and fine and imprisonment. But here it should be remembered, that in this country the constitution guaranties to all person the right to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify the people unnecessarily. We have a statute on the subject, relating to concealed weapons.
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The crime mentioned by Humphry is a public one that involves terrifying the people.
Notice that it is the manner that the right is exercised, not the type of weapon that is carried that constitutes the crime. Humphrey makes it explicit that one may carry weapons so long as it is not in a manner that excites people to unnecessary terror. The unnecessary terror of the people appears to be an essential element. At no point does Humphrey refer to a test of whether the 45 Dueling often resulted in no harm to either party. "If a duel should lead to the death of one of the principals, an event which was by no means so common as the reader of modern historical novels might be led to suppose". into the bareness of the language, one should assume Stephen simply declines to investigate the details of the common law.
G. F. Wharton
The Supreme Court then refers to F. Wharton's A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States.
An affray, as has been noticed, is the fighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of the citizens. (footnote omitted) There is a difference between a sudden affray and a sudden attack. An affray means something like a mutual contest, suddenly excited, without any apparent intention to do any great bodily harm. (footnote omitted). … yet it seems certain that in some cases there may be an affray where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people, which is said to have been always an offence at common law, and is strictly prohibited by the statute. Wharton describes the affray as a crime committed in public, to the terror of the citizens.
Wharton includes a restriction on the affray that other sources do not. Namely, Wharton distinguishes between a sudden attack and a sudden affray. Supposedly, people committing an affray do not wish to do any great bodily harm. Notice that Wharton seems to contradict Dunlap, where Dunlap discusses dueling with the intent to commit murder as an aggravation of an affray.
In addition, Wharton includes in his definition of the affray a requirement that the affray be committed in public. If the fight takes place in private, rather than in public, the fighters may be charged with assault, but not an affray.
Wharton also includes a manner requirement to the rule against dangerous and unusual weapons. The text appears to suggest that if a man armed himself with a dangerous and unusual weapon in such a manner that did not naturally cause a terror to the people, he would not be guilty of an affray.
Once again, a manner restriction as to where and how someone can carry weapons will later be used, by modern courts, to justify a complete prohibition on certain classes of weapons. v. Simpson, 5 Yerger 356). On the same general reasoning, it has been held indictable to drive a carriage through a crowded street, in such a way as to endanger the lives of the passers-by ; (footnote omitted) to disturb a congregation when at religious worship; (footnote omitted) to beset a house, with intent to wound, tar and feather ; (footnote omitted) to raise a liberty-pole, in the year 1794, as a notorious and riotous expression of ill-will to the government ; (footnote omitted) to tear down forcibly and contemptuously an advertisement set up by the commissioners of a sale of land for county taxes ; (footnote omitted) to break into a house in the day-time, and disturb its inhabitants ; (footnote omitted) and to violently disturb a town-meeting, though the parties engaged were not sufficient in number to amount to a riot.' 54 While Wharton does describe restrictions on certain classes of weapons, all of those restrictions occurred after the constitution was ratified. If this is the common law to which the Heller court refers, it is common law that would have been subject to the bounds of the constitution. Normally, when common law is persuasive, it is the common law that came before the constitution was ratified. That common law speaks to what was considered normal at the time. Common law that arises after the constitutional amendment was adopted and conflicts with the constitution should not be cited as support for a particular interpretation of the constitution.
In a first amendment setting, this would be comparable with citing the Alien and Sedition Acts as speaking to the founders' views on the freedom of speech. The constitution has been violated on numerous occasions, many of them shortly after the document was ratified. Simply pointing to a tradition of violating the constitution does not make a statute that is in line with that tradition constitutional. It is therefore puzzling to see references to cases from the 1870s in an originalist 
Wharton compares carrying dangerous weapons is to reckless driving and reckless endangerment.
This makes sense as a manner restriction based upon the terror of the people element.
Presumably, just as one may drive a carriage through a crowded street with due care, one could carry a dangerous weapon in a nonthreatening and careful manner without violating a law.
Wharton then compares carrying dangerous weapons with disturbing a congregation when at religious worship. This comparison is a little more puzzling. Perhaps if one were to disturb a religious congregation (by, say, entering a church during the middle of Easter mass and screaming that there is no god), it would excite them to violence or to such a state of uproar that the interruption should be illegal. The next comparison makes more sense. To beset a house is to "surround and harass" it or to assail the house on all sides. 55 Tar and feathering was not a pleasant practice, and any reasonable person would raise a general hullaballoo if such a performance would save him from this practice. 56 Therefore, to "beset a house with intent to wound, tar, and feather", is to have an angry mob surround a house with the desire to wound and assault and humiliate the occupants. Wharton is saying that the same reasoning used to outlaw besetting a house with intent to wound, tar, and feather is being used to outlaw riding armed with dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. 
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"When heated, tar would blister the skin, but there is little evidence to suggest it regularly was… Yet even when tar was applied cool, it made for a painful experience. Once dry, tar clung tenaciously to the skin and could be removed only with a tremendous amount of scrubbing, possibly with the aid of turpentine or other chemical solvents that would further irritate the skin. Presumably, most victims lost a good deal of body hair; others may have developed tar acne, a skin condition…" Benjamin Ervin, Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American Liberties, pg. 204 New England Quarterly, Vol.76 No.2 Jun. 2003. 57 "Liberty poles originated as large wooden columns--often fashioned out of ship masts--erected in public squares as part of the "rites of resistance" to British authority during the American Revolution. Simon P. Newman, Parades and the Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic 25-29 (1997). After the revolution, they were used as symbols of resistance during the Whiskey Rebellion. Id. at 172-73; see In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, meant to alert people to an auction meant to finance the government were both activities outlawed primarily to curb active resistance against the government. Wharton says that same reasoning being used to outlaw those two activities is used to outlaw carrying dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. This suggests that there is an element of curbing insurrection present in the prohibition against carrying dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. It seems doubtful that the government was outlawing people carrying weapons for self defense. Instead, the government had an interest in outlawing the type of show of force that could help encourage insurrection the same way a liberty pole could encourage insurrection. The government also had an interest in outlawing the type of armed presence that would undermine the rule of law in a similar way that hindering tax auctions would undermine the rule of law.
Next, Wharton compares the reasoning behind outlawing the carrying of dangerous weapons to the terror of the people with the reasoning behind outlawing breaking and entering in the middle of the day to disturb the home's inhabitants. When one imagines the kind of uproar that would happen when one engages in breaking and entering a home to disturb its inhabitants, it speaks to the kind of uproar that might happen if one were to parade down the middle of the street, firing guns into the air, waiving weapons at the population. It also speaks to the level of danger that is discussed. If someone suddenly bursts into a man's home, there is at least some likelihood that the occupant will fear for his life or his family members' lives and will attack the 862, 864, 870 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) (describing the erection of a liberty pole during the Whiskey Rebellion); Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates 419, 421 (Pa. 1795) (referring to liberty poles as one of the "avowed standards of rebellion"). They were also adopted by Jeffersonian Republicans as "prominent and easily recognizable symbols of liberty, equality, and republicanism," and as symbols of opposition to the Federalist government and to the Sedition Act. Newman, supra at 80, 97, 170-76. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the erection of liberty poles "on highways and public squares" by "each political party of the country to express its greater devotion to the rights of the people" had come to be viewed as "a custom sanctioned by a hundred years and interwoven with the traditions, memories and conceded rights of a free people." City of Allegheny v. In order to be charged with rioting, a certain number of people had to be involved.
Blackstone defines a riot as follows, Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, must have three persons at least to constitute them (footnote omitted). … A riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or without a common cause or quarrel (footnote omitted): as if they beat a man; or hunt and kill game in another's park, chase, warren, or liberty; or do any other unlawful act with force and violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and tumultuous manner. 58 Here, it is clear that the link between the reasoning behind the two common law rules is clear.
In a riot, the situation can spiral out of control. The rule against riots is meant to help preserve the public peace and to avoid unruly mobs. Similarly, to preserve the peace, the common law has outlawed reckless displays of firearms in public.
III.
Heller weapons'". 59 The first of these, State v. Langford, is a case discussing the sufficiency and clarity of an indictment. Here, the defendant and several other men armed with guns fired at an elderly woman's house and killed her dog, "thus exciting her alarm for the safety of her person and her property".
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During the opinion, the court discusses whether the actions that led to the indictment were a private trespass or a forcible breach of the public peace. The court wrote, For the counsel for the prosecution, in arguing, say, 'one man may commit a breach of the peace, though not a riot; he might be armed with pistols for aught that appears, and this might be, possibly, proved.' To this the Court answers, "coming with a pistol, though possible, is not to be supposed;' thereby implying, that if the fact of coming with a pistol had been laid in the indictment, it would have been a circumstance in itself naturally implying such a degree of force as was indictable.
One who wishes to interpret this in a manner unfavorable to the civil right to the means to self-defense could suppose that this is an example of presuming anyone armed with a pistol to be an aggressor. The anti-civil rights argument would be that the common law made negative assumptions about people armed with pistols. If this is the case, it is unclear whether the court would make a distinction between loaded and unloaded pistols, holstered or unholstered pistols.
It seems as though one who is armed "for aught that appears" is ready to shoot anything that moves. However, it seems less than likely that "being armed with pistols for aught that appears" could describe an unloaded or holstered weapon. the peace had been committed in the cases" 62 . That is to say that just because someone behaved while armed does not show that a breach of the peace has been committed. Here, it is the manner in which the person with the arms behaved that is the gravamen of the crime. If, instead of shooting at an old woman's house and killing her dog, the defendant had politely knocked on the old woman's door, with his rifle slung over his shoulder, there would have been much less cause for the old woman to fear for her life, her property, and her dog.
Here, the gravamen of the crime seems to be the breach of the peace. The court said, "All the law requires in an indictment of this kind is, that the facts shall be so charged, as to
show that a breach of the peace had been committed, and not merely a civil trespass." 63 Here, it seems like the offense was not based on how unusual the weapons were (the court simply said they were armed with guns 64 ). It might be argued that the dangerousness of the weapons was the gravamen of the crime. However, the death of the dog (the result of the dangerous weapons) was a matter of aggravation, not the "corpus delicti" or body of the crime. Instead, it was the frightening and threatening behavior of the defendant that constituted the crime. The defendant terrified the victim, and it is the actions that made her feel threatened and fear for her safety and the safety of her property that seem to be the focus of the court, not the type of weapons used.
In any case, it is unclear how the Supreme Court in Heller did or would place significance on this opinion.
B. O'Neill v. State
Justice Scalia then references O'Neill v. State, where a man insulted a second man, who then beat the first man with a cane. The first man did not resist, and the question before the court 62 Id 63 Id. 64 Id. "These men were armed with guns, which they fired at the house of an unprotected female, thus exciting her alarm for the safety of her person and her property."
was whether the first man was also guilty of the affray. The Court states, "[i]t is probable, however, that if persons arm themselves with deadly or unusual weapons for the purpose of an affray, and in such a manner as to strike terror to the people, they may be guilty of this offence, without coming to actual blows." 65 With this language, the judge seems to suggest that if the persons had armed themselves for a reason other than an affray, and did not actually come to blows, they might not be guilty of the offense. If we were to apply this rule to modern day statutes, laws that prohibit people arming themselves with intent to engage a public fight would probably fall under the limitation on the second amendment to which Justice Scalia referred. If we look to this question in the light of judicial reason, without the aid of specific authority, we shall be led to the conclusion that the provision protects only the right to 'keep' such 'arms' as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from those which are employed in quarrels and broils, and fights between maddened individuals, since such are properly known by the name of 'arms'. … To refer the deadly devices and instruments called in the statute "(sic)"deadly weapons," to the proper or necessary arms of a "wellregulated militia," is simply ridiculous. No kind of travesty, however subtle or ingenious, could so misconstrue this provision of the constitution of the United States, as to make it cover and protect that pernicious vice, from which so many murders, assassinations, and deadly assaults have sprung, and which it was doubtless the intention of the legislature to punish and prohibit. The word "arms" in the connection we find it in the constitution of the United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the word is used in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are the musket and bayonet; of cavalry and dragoons, the sabre, holster pistols and carbine; of artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and mortar, with side arms. The Terms dirks, daggers, slungshots, swordcanes, brassknuckles and bowie knives, belong to no military vocabulary. Where a soldier on duty found with any of these things about his person, he would be punished for an offense against discipline. … We confess it appears to us little short of ridiculous, that any one should claim the right to carry upon his person any of the mischievous devices inhibited by the statute, into a peaceable public assembly, as, for instance into a church, a lecture room, a ball room, or any other place where ladies and gentlemen are congregated together. However, the court also states, "In this case we attach no importance to the fact that the defendant had no arms, for we think it may be conceded that driving or riding without arms through a court house or a crowded street at such a rate or in such a manner as to endanger the safety of the inhabitants amounts to a breach of the peace and is an indictable offence at the common law. 
IV. Post-Heller interpretations of dangerous and unusual weapons
In the third district of California, Judge Sims upheld California's ban on so-called "assault weapons" based primarily on Heller's reasoning that prohibitions based upon classes of weapons were fairly supported by the traditional prohibition on the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. 82 California law outlaws possession of so-called "assault weapons", a term that is defined in a way that baffles the mind. The law outlaws a semi-automatic centerfire rifle that can accept a clip and has a thumbhole stock. 83 A thumbhole stock is a stock that one can put his It allows the shooter to hold the rifle with his knuckles facing horizontally rather than vertically.
With and without the modifications, the rifle has the same capabilities. With the modifications, the rifle is deemed to be an "assault weapon", and is therefore illegal. Without it, the rifle is not classified as an "assault weapon" and is therefore lawful. Other authors have noticed the misleading definition of the scare term "assault weapons". 86 "For example, the term 'assault weapon' has become so elastic that it has been applied to a revolving firearm and even a single shot firearm."
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The part of this statute that was challenged was the prohibition on so-called "assault weapons"
and a prohibition on a gun that shoots a particular type of bullet, a 50 caliber bmg. 88 The court So if the court wants modern firearms to be protected under the Second Amendment, how should the common use test be applied to newly invented weapons?
The most frustrating part of the common use test is that it doesn't measure how dangerous a society would be if a given ban remained in effect or if it was lifted. 103 What place does popularity have in determining whether a gun ban should be constitutional? Under Heller, the answer is "it has at least some weight".
The common use test is not supported under an originalist style of interpretation, and it was not included in the original meaning or understanding of the Second Amendment. It is circular, allows for arbitrary and cosmetic distinctions between firearms, and will result in differing outcomes for similar fact patterns. However, it is currently the law of the land. Another possibility is that the court did not care about the history as much as they did the outcome of the case and the precedent it sets. But if this is the case, why write an originalist opinion? Was Justice Scalia simply trying to inundate the reporters with his style of interpretation? And if this is the case, why not explain why the policy outweighs the history in this particular matter?
103 Both sides of the gun control debate can probably agree with this statement. On one side, people who want more gun control want the court to be able to determine how dangerous a weapon is to society when deciding whether to keep a ban. On the other side, people who want less gun control want a court to consider how undesirable society will become when that option for self defense (against private or governmental aggressors) is taken away, along with their liberty to possess a type of weapon.
A third possibility is strategic fallacy. If Justice Scalia wanted to write an opinion that protected firearms, save for three exceptions, 104 and if one of the other judges that was needed for a majority wanted a fourth exception, 105 what does a strategic judge do? A strategic judge would provide the strongest possible support for every part of the majority opinion, save for the part with which he or she disagreed. Perhaps, in the hopes that someday when the makeup or the disposition of the court is different the court will revisit the issue, Justice Scalia posited the shakiest argument that he thought would escape unnoticed by his colleagues. This would set the stage for a future court to examine the case, upholding three of the exceptions, striking down the fourth, and declaring, "The Supreme Court never had a good reason for this."
Conclusion
The future of firearms litigation is far from clear. So long as courts continue to use the historically inaccurate definition of "dangerous and unusual weapons" embraced in Heller, common use tests are bound to be a part of second amendment jurisprudence. A re-examination of the definition of "dangerous and unusual weapons" may result in a more historically accurate Second Amendment jurisprudence, as well as a more rational approach to firearms regulation.
